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INNOVATION AND INEQUALITY:  
THE SEPARABILITY THESIS 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN* 
The topic of this Essay concerns the interaction between 
innovation in areas of intellectual property on the one hand 
and the demand for greater equality of income and wealth in 
society on the other. Whatever one thinks of the latter objec-
tive, I think that it is a social mistake to link these two sepa-
rate topics together. The correct approach is instead sequen-
tial. First, develop a set of rules that promotes the maximum 
level of innovation. Once that innovation question is settled, 
address inequality in income and wealth from a broader per-
spective—one that does not develop special rules to deal 
with intellectual property issues. I call this the “separability 
thesis.” 
In making this claim, I do not wish to insist that the prob-
lem of inequality, which for many people is the dominant 
social challenge of our time, does not matter. Instead I want 
to address the related question of whether inequality is ad-
dressed better by private or public means—to which my own 
answer is that decentralized private activity, buttressed by a 
charitable contribution deduction, will on balance work bet-
ter than any modification of intellectual property rights. 
Hence I would argue that inequality matters but is better 
addressed separately from the question of innovation. 
I think that the Essays of Professor John McGinnis1 and Beth 
Kregor2 strengthen the case for the separability thesis. 
                                                                                                        
 * Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Peter 
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall 
Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer of Law, The 
University of Chicago Law School. My thanks to Rachel E. Cohn, Madeline Lan-
sky, and Krista Perry, The University of Chicago Law School Class of 2016 for the 
excellent research assistance. This Essay was adapted from remarks given at the 
2015 Federalist Society National Student Symposium held at the University of 
Chicago. 
 1. John McGinnis, How Innovation Makes Us More Equal, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 47 (2016). 
2 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 39 
 
In his presentation, Professor McGinnis speaks about the 
huge power of intellectual property to speed up the leveling of 
wealth and opportunities across people in different social stra-
ta. His central point is that the rapid reduction in the costs of 
standard technologies—think smartphones and social media—
increases the opportunities for personal advancement of those 
who are at the bottom of the income distribution. Lower prices 
give greater access to all, producing higher levels of overall so-
cial satisfaction, even if, as Adam Smith’s invisible hand re-
minds us, that consequence was not part of the innovator’s in-
tention. 3  The innovator’s own self-interest aligns with a 
desirable social objective.4 
The more controversial portion of McGinnis’s thesis is that 
the pace of innovation will insulate the new technological in-
dustries from the heavy hand of government innovation. In 
general, I think that his prognosis is overly optimistic, because 
resourceful and determined governments can always initiate 
anti-competitive regulations no matter what the present level 
of technology by focusing on its most vulnerable components. 
To give a simple example, companies like Uber and Airbnb do 
not just operate in an online environment. They have to deliver 
their rides and their accommodations in physical space, where 
they are vulnerable to regulations. Hence, it is possible for a 
single mid-level administrative official to attack the Uber busi-
ness model that treats its drivers as independent contractors 
and not as employees—a status that is right now under serious 
legal challenge.5 Airbnb must arrange for its customers to have 
rooms, which in turn could subject individual owners to vari-
ous restrictions and hotel taxes, which Airbnb actually wants to 
                                                                                                        
 2. Beth Kregor, Innovation & Inequality: Conservative & Libertarian Perspectives, 39 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (2016). 
 3. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS ¶ 4.2.9 (1776) (“By preferring the 
support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; 
and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the 
greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other 
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his inten-
tion.”). 
 4.  Id. 
 5. See Dave Jamieson, Uber Driver Is An Employee, Not An Independent Contractor, 
Rules California Labor Official, HUFFPOST BUS. (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/17/uber-independent-
contractors_n_7604366.html [http://perma.cc/HM4T-BJ3B]. 
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collect itself in order to gain legal legitimacy.6 And, of course, it 
must worry about serious issues such as zoning laws and land-
lord restrictions as it runs its business.7 
It is not possible here to comment at length on the soundness 
of these various taxes and regulations. But that lack of specificity 
does not in my view undermine the essential argument for the 
separability thesis. Do not use regulation of specific firms or in-
dustries to secure redistributive ends. Indeed, it is critical to note 
that innovation can be socially valuable even if it does not result 
in higher levels of income equality. The argument runs as fol-
lows: Greater access is a byproduct of greater innovation, as are 
the benefits to those at the bottom of the income distribution. Yet 
by the same token, it is not clear that greater equality follows. It 
could well be that the informational elites gain more than indi-
viduals at the bottom of the income distribution. But therein lies 
the rub: any consistent Pareto improvement is less problematic 
than any forced redistribution, and these Pareto improvements 
often occur by increasing inequality.8 Somebody who buys a 
computer may go from ten to a thousand, but the computer 
manufacturer may go from a million to a billion dollars. Both are 
improvements. If the inequality barrier is pushed too hard, it 
dampens the entire improvement cycle. Even for the foes of ine-
quality, industry-specific interventions are always a mistake be-
cause the issue can be addressed separately without destroying 
this Pareto improvement. 
The concern that Ms. Kregor voices goes in the opposite di-
rection, for she talks about the displacement effect that innova-
tion has on those persons who are at the bottom of the econom-
ic ladder. Again, this topic is not unique to the area of 
intellectual property. Anyone who has paid the slightest atten-
tion to the debates over tariffs and unions knows that this fun-
                                                                                                        
 6. Dara Kerr, Airbnb: Let Us Pay Hotel Taxes in New York, CNET (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/airbnb-let-us-pay-hotel-taxes-in-new-york/ 
[http://perma.cc/G7YC-VB3D]. 
 7. Stephen Fishman, Legal Restrictions to Renting Your Home on Airbnb or Other 
Rental Services, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/legal-restrictions-
renting-your-home-airbnb-other-rental-services.html [http://perma.cc/W2VR-
Q32J] (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). 
 8. A Pareto improvement is an incremental improvement that improves the 
well-being of at least one person while not harming the well-being of anyone. See 
NICHOLAS BARR, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WELFARE STATE 45 (5th ed. 2012). 
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damental tension plays itself out whenever there is a change in 
relative wages and prices.9 In some cases, it comes from new 
sources of goods and services, and, in others, it comes from in-
novation that displaces jobs. But here, too, it is important to 
note that any study of displacement that looks only at the nega-
tives seriously underestimates the complexity of the overall 
situation. The displacement of some jobs results in the ability to 
produce a new (and improved) suite of products at lower pric-
es than before, which in turn opens up opportunities for entre-
preneurs and businesses to enhance their own competitive po-
sitions, not only in domestic markets but in foreign markets as 
well. The loss of jobs comes as a hard blow to many, but the 
opportunities that they receive for employment in new indus-
try sectors cannot be ignored in the larger scheme of things. 
Nor is there any reason, if displacement does justify some form 
of transitional aid, that the case is more compelling in the con-
text of displacement through innovation in intellectual proper-
ty than it is in the context of foreign competition in goods or 
services that comes from the dismantling of tariff barriers, im-
port quotas, or other protectionist legislation. 
In many cases, the concern with inequality does not express 
itself as the difference between the top one percent and the rest 
of society. Instead, in good populist fashion, the challenges are 
against those few “billionaires” who have acquired their mas-
sive wealth through innovation.10 What is striking about these 
innovators is the quickness with which they amass their for-
tunes—often only in a matter of months or years. But there are 
again several points that ease the ostensible pain in these is-
sues. First, it is generally the case today that the billionaires are 
the innovators and not their children or other descendants. Lest 
anyone doubt that conclusion, it is well to reflect that John D. 
Rockefeller was hugely rich—indeed far richer relative to his 
                                                                                                        
 9. Josh Bivens, The TPP Debate: Never Real and No Longer Polite, ECON. POL’Y 
INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG (May 15, 2015, 12:15 PM), 
http://www.epi.org/blog/the-tpp-debate-never-real-and-no-longer-polite/ 
[htpp://perma.cc/22JM-Q26L]. 
 10. Anne Gearan & Philip Rucker, Democracy Not ‘Just For Billionaires,’ Hillary 
Clinton Tells Crowd in N.Y., WASH. POST (June 13, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democracy-not-just-for-billionaires-
hillary-clinton-tells-crowd-in-ny/2015/06/13/346e3318-11fb-11e5-a0fe-
dccfea4653ee_story.html [http://perma.cc/58FP-KPTX]. 
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time than any billionaire is today.11 Yet time takes its toll. A 
look at the Forbes list of the top 500 wealthiest individuals in 
the United States contains no Rockefeller, as the original John 
D.’s huge fortune has been spread by inheritance over multiple 
generations across a large number of individuals.12 Indeed, the 
top places on the list are all occupied by individuals like Bill 
Gates, Larry Page, Sergei Brin, and Mark Zuckerberg, who 
have made their own fortunes after starting from relatively 
modest circumstances.13 Clearly, the great wealth at the top of 
the distribution increases inequality of wealth. But in my view 
that profound change is a reason to rejoice rather than to la-
ment. I see several reasons for doing so. 
The first point in this analysis is that wealth, especially 
wealth at those great levels, is a very poor proxy for human 
well-being. The point is missed, for example, in Thomas Piket-
ty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century,14 which enjoys a hero’s 
welcome from such Nobel Laureates as Paul Krugman and Jo-
seph Stieglitz,15 only to have lost its popular cachet in recent 
months.16 The key question is how well the inequality of wealth 
correlates with the inequality of overall well-being. On this 
measure it is critical in all these cases to take into account the 
various forms of nonpecuniary benefits that people have—for 
these can never be concentrated in the few fortunate individu-
                                                                                                        
 11. Carl O’Donnell, The Rockefellers: The Legacy Of History’s Richest Man, FORBES 
(Jul 11, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/carlodonnell/2014/07/11/the-
rockefellers-the-legacy-of-historys-richest-man/ [http://perma.cc/Y3KC-CYRD]. 
 12. See Forbes Billionaires: Full List of the 500 Richest People in the World 2015, 
FORBES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ chasewithorn/2015/03/02/
forbes-billionaires-full-list-of-the-500-richest-people-in-the-world-2015/ 
[http://perma.cc/YQS2-VGCK]. 
 13. See id. 
 14. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). 
 15. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op.-Ed., Wealth over Work, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/opinion/krugman-wealth-over-
work.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/82DF-3LKM]. 
 16. See, e.g., Mervyn King, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, 
Review, THE TELEGRAPH (May 10, 2014), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/bookreviews/10816161/Capital-in-the-
Twenty-First-Century-by-Thomas-Piketty-review.html [http://perma.cc/B27M-
MUSR]. 
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als at the top.17 In its simplest form, the observation is that good 
health is as important to happiness as is great wealth. As a 
rough guess, it is not unreasonable to say that these full sets of 
nonpecuniary advantages are at least as important as the pecu-
niary ones, so that severe deprivations in social companionship 
or health count as much in their own way as high levels of 
poverty. On this score, life expectancy is of huge importance, as 
is infant mortality and a host of other measures. Quite happily, 
it is not possible to confine these critical benefits to any thin 
fraction of the population. The first round of major modern ad-
vances, say between 1850 and 1900, constructing sewers and 
fighting contagious diseases, and the close connections be-
tween them, were chiefly financed by the wealthy because the 
poor lacked the financial resources to contribute much to these 
infrastructure improvements.18 But the benefits of these activi-
ties are widely dispersed throughout society as one of the most 
vital public goods. There is no way that average life expectancy 
in the United States, for example, could go from about 46 in 
1900 to about 79 today19 without some broad-scale distribution 
of the social benefits from increased longevity. 
It is, of course, still better to be rich than to be poor when it 
comes to gaining access to healthcare services. But it is im-
portant to note that inequality ratios matter little in the face of 
net overall improvements of health care levels. What matters are 
the total savings in numbers of lives.20 For instance, suppose 
that poor Americans are about 2.5 times as likely to suffer from 
infant mortality as the richest ones. It is a difference that mat-
ters. It is imperative to keep such differences in perspective. 
                                                                                                        
 17. For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Piketty Fallacy, HOOVER INST. 
(May 5, 2014), http://www.hoover.org/research/piketty-fallacy 
[http://perma.cc/48XD-S6R4]. 
 18. For an overview of how select moguls used their wealth to promote societal 
welfare in this era, see Shanaz Musafer, Past philanthropists: How giving has evolved, 
BBC (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-19272109 
[http://perma.cc/DK3F-WP9Q] . 
 19. For some general statistics, see Max Roser, Life Expectancy, OUR WORLD IN 
DATA (2015), http://ourworldindata.org/data/population-growth-vital-statistics/ 
life-expectancy/ [http://perma.cc/YY2K-LU9W]. 
 20. For just this overemphasis on relative position, see Michael Marmot, The 
Influence of Income on Health: Views of an Epidemiologist, HEALTH AFF. 31 
(March/April 2002), available at http://www3.nd.edu/~wevans1/class_
papers/marmot_health_affairs.pdf [http://perma.cc/U5U6-7GG8]. 
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Those numbers carry one message if, as was roughly the case 
in 1900, ten percent of the children of the wealthy die, as com-
pared to twenty-five percent of the children of the poor.21 But 
they have quite another when the first number goes down to 
less than one percent, and the latter to less than 2.5 percent, 
similar to numbers today, so that the absolute gap narrows by 
tenfold.22 Clearly poorer people gain more from these initia-
tives because, starting from their poor position, they have more 
to gain. 
Nor does the good news stop there. As noted, today’s high-
prized technology improvements are spread rapidly as costs 
decrease.23 For example, the rate of injuries from industrial ac-
cidents has rapidly declined, perhaps by an order of magni-
tude24 so that one of the most burning issues from 1900 is a sec-
ond-order question today relative to the fierce controversies 
                                                                                                        
 21. See id. at 34; see also Achievements in Public Health, 1900-1999: Healthier Mothers 
and Babies, CDC (Sept. 30, 1999), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/ 
mmwrhtml/mm4838a2.htm#fig1 [http://perma.cc/6FK3-9PY3] (finding that the 
infant mortality rate in certain urban areas approached 30% in 1900, yet the aver-
age infant mortality rate decreased to 10% by 1915 when public health conditions 
improved across America). 
 22. For complete infant mortality statistics, see GOAPL K. SINGH & PETER C. VAN 
DYCK, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INFANT MORTALITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1935-2007: OVER SEVEN DECADES OF PROGRESS AND DISPARITIES at 2 
(2010), http://www.hrsa.gov/healthit/images/mchb_infantmortality_pub.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/My2C-T3TZ] (indicating that the infant mortality rate was 0.67% 
in the U.S. in 2009). For a detailed study on the effect of poverty on infant mortali-
ty rates, see Lucy Westbott, Washington’s Poorest Infants Are Ten Times More Likely 
to Die Than Richest, NEWSWEEK, May 4, 2015. 
 23. For discussion of cost-reducing innovation in and outside of the health care 
sector, see James C. Robinson & Mark D. Smith, Cost-Reducing Innovation In Health 
Care, HEALTH AFF. 1353-54 (Sept./Oct. 2008), http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
content/27/5/1353.full.pdf+html [http://perma.cc/Z8NX-FE5A]. For an example of 
the decreasing costs in consumer electronics, see, for example, Damon Darlin, 
Falling Costs of Big-Screen TV’s to Keep Falling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005. For a dis-
cussion of the decline in shipping costs leading to rapid growth in trade and the 
subsequent spread of innovation, see David Hummels, Transportation Costs and 
International Trade in the Second Era of Globalization, 21(3) J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 139 
(2007). 
 24. There is no single database that explores this issue, but a number of 
different accounts all support the same story of rapid declines. A 
CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report from 1999 reports a 90% de-
cline, from 37 per 100,000 workers in 1933 to 4 per 100,000 workers from in 
1997. The rate has continued to fall thereafter to 3.3. by 2013. 
CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 461 (1999).  
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that it generated a century ago.25 The rate of progress has accel-
erated in these dimensions. It is important that no one, pro-
gressive or conservative, lose sight of the other. 
Yet another way to get a sense of the distributional conse-
quences of technological advance is to take a look at consumer 
surplus, that is, the difference between the reservation price of 
the consumer and the market price.26 Every time the price of 
some product is driven down, somebody who spends $200 for 
something that he paid $1,000 for in the past gets $800 worth of 
surplus. In addition, the people who stayed out at $1000 but 
who came in later also get consumer surplus, so that the new 
entrant who would have paid $600 for that product enjoys a 
$400 surplus. The size of the consumer surplus is huge. Yet the 
surplus on the producer side cannot be higher than the price 
and is obviously far lower than that. So again, routine market 
surpluses, both in technology and otherwise, tend to allocate 
an unobservable source of human gain to consumers, especial-
ly those with limited wealth who cannot remain in the market 
if the prices are raised too high.27 
There is yet another nice feature about huge concentrations 
of wealth. The people who have acquired that wealth cannot 
possibly consume it. I recall that Robert Barro, now at Harvard 
University, observed that the good thing about hugely wealthy 
people is that they cannot consume more than a tiny fraction of 
the wealth they create, no matter how self-indulgent they be-
come.28 Fine wines and luxurious cruises can only go so far. But 
the moment the rich start to buy capital assets like houses or 
                                                                                                        
 25. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure 
of Workers' Compensation, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982). 
 26. For an explanation of how the Internet increases consumer surplus, see Net 
Benefits: How to quantify the gains that the internet has brought to consumers, THE 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013. 
 27. For an example of how technology advancements allow for increased con-
sumer surplus and participation in the book market, see, for example, Erik 
Brynjolfsson et al., Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of 
Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers, 49(11) MGMT. SCI. 1580, 1588–89, 
1591–92 (2003). 
 28. For the benefits of high concentrations of wealth, see Robert A. Barro, Ine-
quality, Growth, and Investment, in INEQUALITY AND TAX POLICY 1, 34 (Kevin A. 
Hassett & R. Glenn Hubbard eds., 2001) (explaining how inequality encourages 
growth in richer places, while also decreasing over time as a part of the process of 
economic development). 
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fine art, they are no longer in the consumption business. They 
have now acquired durable capital assets that hold their value 
longer than a year—usually much longer. Those assets will 
survive their death and will therefore necessarily help fund 
ventures that can increase the wealth of others, either by going 
to charitable foundations or by descending to the next genera-
tion, who will also invest a large fraction of their wealth, even 
as the wealth per capita declines (again, no Rockefeller alive 
today is in the top 500 wealthiest persons in the United 
States).29 Indeed, their financial capital will go into markets 
where it will lower the market rate of interest across the board. 
Now that consumption is not an option, redistribution becomes 
a kind of accrued physical necessity. Indeed, in the eyes of 
many wealthy persons (like those who take the Buffett-Gates 
Giving Pledge—a commitment by the world’s wealthiest indi-
viduals and families to dedicate the majority of their wealth to 
philanthropy)30 it also becomes something of a crusade or a 
moral duty. The most successful entrepreneurs end up spend-
ing their wealth on all sorts of things that actually have widely-
diffused benefits like universities, hospitals, orphanages, dis-
ease prevention and the like. 
In the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth centu-
ry, laissez-faire methodology was at its zenith.31 Yet this was 
also the period in which voluntary giving to help the poor in 
one form or another through churches, organizations, formal 
insurance, and setting up charitable institutions was at its 
high.32 Society had, roughly speaking, only ten or fifteen per-
cent of the average wealth today, and the number of people 
who starved in the streets in those times was still virtually ze-
                                                                                                        
 29. See Forbes Billionaires, supra note 12. 
 30. For an overview of the pledge program and list of contributors, see Current 
Pledgers, THE GIVING PLEDGE (2015), http://givingpledge.org/index.html 
[http://perma.cc/92N6-APAT]. 
 31. See H. SCOTT GORDON, THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
246 (1st ed. 1993). 
 32. For a discussion on philanthropy during the Gilded Age, see BENJAMIN SO-
SKIS, HUDSON INST., BOTH MORE AND NO MORE: THE HISTORICAL SPLIT BETWEEN 
CHARITY AND PHILANTHROPY at 12 (Oct. 15, 2014), 
http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1433/both_
more_and_no_more_the_historical_split_between_charity_and_philanthropy.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/PMG8-2PQE]. 
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ro.33 To make the point concrete, it is important to connect the 
name with the place. John D. Rockefeller founded the Universi-
ty of Chicago and the Rockefeller Institute.34 Johns Hopkins 
founded Johns Hopkins. Leland Stanford Junior University 
was founded by his father.35 Sloan-Kettering was founded by 
Alfred Sloan and Charles Kettering, who worked with cars and 
batteries. 36  Andrew Carnegie and Andrew Mellon founded 
Carnegie-Mellon,37 and so the beat goes on with every school 
within every university and every program within every 
school. The level of voluntary redistribution is high, and those 
who spend their money helping others take care to see that it is 
spent well. These effects are of course most profound at the 
top, and they should give warning to anyone who thinks that 
the distribution of consumption benefits closely tracks the dis-
tribution of income. In fact, it is always less skewed, given the 
gifts to charity and, to a lesser extent, informal gifts within fam-
ilies. Beware of any efforts to measure social inequality solely 
by income figures. 
*     *     * 
Let us now turn quickly from inequality to innovation. One 
point of note is the distinction between innovation and entre-
                                                                                                        
 33. Compare CLARENCE D. LONG, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., WAGES AND EARN-
INGS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1890 at 144, 155 (1960) (estimating that—in terms 
of 1914 dollars—the average annual income of all American non-farm employees 
was $375 in 1870, which computes to $8,950 in 2015 dollars) with CARMEN DENA-
VAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POV-
ERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 at  7 (Sept. 2014) (reporting that the average 
household income in the U.S. is now $51,939); therefore, the average household 
income during the Gilded Age—after adjusting for inflation—was approximately 
15% that of what it is today). 
 34. John D. Rockefeller, HISTORY.COM (2010), http://www.history.com/topics/john-
d-rockefeller [http://perma.cc/QPE3-ZAKY]. 
 35. History of Stanford, STANFORD UNIV., https://www.stanford.edu/ 
about/history/ [http://perma.cc/4PCW-SJLN] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
 36. Alfred P. Sloan Jr. Dead at 90; G.M. Leader and Philanthropist, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
19, 1966), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0523.html 
[http://perma.cc/9S9M-3CYR]; Stuart W. Leslie, Kettering, Charles Franklin, AMERI-
CAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY ONLINE, http://www.anb.org/articles/13/13-00910.html 
[http://perma.cc/R8BY-W85H] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
 37. History & Traditions, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., http://www. cmu.edu/ about/ 
history/index.shtml [http://perma.cc/7XEY-46ST] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015); Mellon 
Institute of Industrial Research, Carnegie Mellon University, AMERICAN CHEMICAL 
SOCIETY, http://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/ education/whatischemistry/land 
marks/mellon-institute.html [http://perma.cc/XJ97-LJ9J] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
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preneurial behavior. These two desirable sets of skills do not 
function in the same way and do not require the same kinds of 
traits. They are not funded in the same way. Innovation is 
about trying to figure out, through bits and pieces, a technolo-
gy, a process, an idea, or a program that essentially nobody has 
ever thought about before. Entrepreneurship is about setting 
up a restaurant or a laundry or other business in places where 
other people have not yet entered. 
So consider the young Fred Smith who wanted to put together 
a company called FedEx. He claims to have gotten his usual C at 
Yale College for proposing the Federal Express business model.38 
But it turns out that it is a good idea for people to use Memphis, 
Tennessee, as a hub for the collection and distribution of pack-
ages, both for speed and cost.39 There is no technological innova-
tion in discovering that catchment basins work better than point-
to-point shipping plans. It is not a deep subject. It is hub-and-
spoke technology carried out on a very high level.40 
Now a business like Federal Express will also be an avid con-
sumer of technology, which helps it to organize its tracking 
and delivery systems. But then the question becomes how to 
actually put a technology together? And that is a very compli-
cated process, which goes through multiple iterations, twists 
and turns. After the fact, a technological advance may look self-
evident. But in the middle of the cycle it is chaotic in the ex-
treme and therefore not easily subject to direct regulation. In-
deed, the initial steps usually take place outside any regulator’s 
ken, when the initial rounds of financing come from the three 
Fs: family, friends, and fools.41 
Innovation is often subject to high rates of error and hence 
high rates of failure, so the initial rounds of funding come 
chiefly from individuals with an affective interest in the inno-
                                                                                                        
 38. Online Extra: Fred Smith on the Birth of FedEx, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2004), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2004-09-19/online-extra-fred-smith-on-
the-birth-of-fedex [http://perma.cc/8QJ6-PBV6]. 
 39. The History of FedEx, FEDEX CORP., http://about.van.fedex.com/our-story/ 
history-timeline/history/ [http://perma.cc/56VK-CZS7] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Robert Cooter, Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of Nations, 33 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 373, 377 (2005). 
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vator.42 The few individuals who survive the first part of the 
cycle then have to confront the question of whether they have 
something distinctive that justifies heavy investments by out-
side investors who ask this question: “What is it that you’ve got 
that nobody else has, by way of an intellectual property patent 
or copyright or trade secret, which will allow you to get some 
kind of a super-competitive profit?” The venture capital types 
understand that they have to invest in a large number of dis-
tinct ventures, most of which will ultimately fail.43 Their theory 
is, as with oil wells, that if an innovator hit a gusher in one or 
two cases, he has done very well even if the rest of his ventures 
failed. The investors in Google in 1997 are very rich, even if 
they lost everything on all their other investments. 
Now, how do these organizations get their start? In a word, 
erratically. Their principals hire and fire staff with great rapidity. 
They plan mission statements that go first this way and then that 
way. Looking at it from the outside with the eyes of a central 
planner would be like watching a bunch of dodo birds moving 
in random sequence. But if you could actually understand as an 
insider what is going on, it would turn out that some of these 
entrepreneurs are making adjustments and corrections that ac-
tually work. 
The financing in all of these ventures is commonly through 
multiple rounds of equity, because there is no lending arrange-
ment that makes any sense.44 When there is a high failure rate, 
people receive no share of the upside with respect to the venture 
and are guaranteed to lose money. So instead there are rounds of 
equity financing and participation. The earlier an investor gets 
into the business, the higher the rate of return, to offset the 
                                                                                                        
 42. Mitch Free, Entrepreneurs: If You Love Your Family, Don’t Let Them Invest in 
Your Startup, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/ sites/mitchfree/2013/ 
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 43. Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start-Ups Fail, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB10000872396390443
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 44. Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 1998, at 131, 
132, available at https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works 
[http://perma.cc/CV5N-Z3ZD]. 
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greater risk.45 As the risk starts to go down, the return goes 
down with it.46 It is a perfectly rational system run by pros. 
So now we ask this troubling question: If this is how the in-
novation process works, what possible way is there to equalize 
opportunities for people regardless of—and fill in the blank—
class, race, age, sex, sexual orientation? It does not matter 
which. The need for having highly firm-specific contracts and 
for constant re-contracting means that any external constraint 
on how these businesses hire and fire, or how they compensate 
their employees, can easily stifle the flexibility they need to 
thrive. The intelligent government official in this context needs 
sufficient humility to say: “Frankly, I don’t understand what’s 
going on in these beehives of disjointed activity. It is probably a 
good thing, because if I understood what these guys are doing, 
their activities would have little social value, because someone 
else would already have it figured out. So let them work. In 
time, some of these will attract venture capital and go public 
for the benefit of us all.” Patience among regulators is a prized 
frame of mind. In the context of innovation, the fight is to pre-
vent regulations aimed at reducing inequality from stifling the 
growth in the first place. 
In the context of entrepreneurship, the fight is different. The 
entrepreneurs supported by the Institute for Justice (IJ) are in a 
different line of business altogether. These entrepreneurs are not 
innovators seeking to develop novel technologies. Instead IJ has 
a different but still vital mission: it tries to assist those popula-
tions that have been systematically shut out from the overall sys-
tem, typically by a whole range of inexcusable, indescribable, 
and indefensible regulations.47 Most of these regulations could 
become things of the past if the Supreme Court resurrected the 
key constitutional doctrines protecting economic liberties that 
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went down in flames in the New Deal in 1937.48 But these doc-
trines were far more attuned for an entrepreneurial spirit prior 
to the point where the misnamed Progressive Era managed to 
stunt innovation. 
The peril is that every single political economy that relies ex-
clusively on democratic processes that destroy private property 
rights will produce degenerate results because the power of fac-
tion means that the parties who are in favor of stifling innova-
tion will gain power. Once they get their way, it is exceedingly 
difficult to displace. The recent decision in Horne49 is more than a 
conceptual mess. It is a testimony that once various acreage and 
quota programs are put into place it becomes ever so difficult to 
dislodge them, even with prolonged litigation that produces on-
ly equivocal results. It is therefore critical to note that the strong 
protection of economic liberties, which makes it harder to attack 
entrepreneurs by new entry restrictions, also works to protect 
innovators from parallel forms of regulation. 
It is no coincidence therefore that sustained levels of economic 
growth were associated with the strong judicial philosophy of 
laissez-faire present not only in Lochner v. New York,50 but more 
importantly, Adair v. United States51 and Coppage v. Kansas52—all 
of which held that the government monopolization of any kind 
of market, such as labor or agriculture, which could be operated 
competitively, did not pass constitutional muster. But that sys-
tem failed in light of the inordinate appeal of German-type cor-
poratist thinking, which leads to the creation of government-
sponsored monopolies. 53  So my suggestion for general im-
provement on entrepreneurship is not exclusively technology-
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based. Rather, it goes back to the strong insistence that no gov-
ernment action should ever be allowed to convert a competitive 
industry into a monopolistic one. That view allows, but only 
cautiously, the regulation of large industries through a mix of 
antitrust and common carrier regulation. During the period be-
tween 1890 and 1937 this system was not perfect, but it was 
markedly more sophisticated than the strong hands-off attitude 
that the Supreme Court takes on these issues today.54 
It is at this point that the value of the work of IJ is so valuable. 
What Ms. Kregor and her colleagues do is attack those state-
created entry barriers in state and local law.55 The enemy of IJ’s 
drivers turns out to be protectionism. That is also an obstacle 
that many innovators face, but at one level, as Professor McGin-
nis said, the technologist may be better off by opening up territo-
ry where no one has entered before, where it is less likely that 
there is some built-in constituency to block development. 
Yet the relative immunity of technology from regulation 
tends to disappear when high doses of technology are intro-
duced into new entrepreneurial ventures. The most obvious 
illustration to which Ms. Kregor alluded was Uber, whose dis-
ruptive technology has spurred strong efforts by existing 
transportation companies to get it out, and by many activists to 
break its business model by denying them the status of inde-
pendent existing cab drivers.56 And it is actually a very compli-
cated question because it raises at least one serious problem of 
the second-best: what adjustments should be made in reaction 
to an initial mistake in the allocation of the rights to run taxi-
cabs on public streets. 
In what I regard as a quite indefensible series of maneuvers, 
virtually every local government says: “We own the public 
roads. Therefore we can exclude people. Therefore we can make 
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their entry subject to conditions. Therefore we can issue limited 
licenses for taxi cabs, charge them for their medallions and then 
say to them that they’re going to be able to keep their wealth by 
giving them exclusives with the applicable territory.” 
Once the government has taken that first decisive step, the 
industry in which the privilege has been granted is no longer 
competitive. Now it is what Gordon Tullock many years ago 
called the “transition gains trap.”57 There is now a regime of 
legal protection, which was undesirable but is nonetheless now 
in place. What should be done when it turns out these people 
have sold their medallions or mortgaged them on the promise, 
often explicit, that they could keep their preferred system be-
cause the government will not issue new licenses or, in the case 
of taxi cabs, new medallions?58 
The challenge in this situation is to think about how to oper-
ate transitions. On this matter it is best to consider the alloca-
tive question first so as to increase the size of the pie.59 Once 
that is answered, it is then necessary to examine the distribu-
tive question, which asks something about the size and owner-
ship of each slice. 
On allocation, the key question is whether the world is a bet-
ter place with new firms like Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb. And the 
answer to that question is an unambiguous “yes.” The Uber 
system, for example, supplies all sorts of information that 
standard cab services cannot supply.60 It gives location and 
time of arrival. It sets up a telephone connection to allow cor-
rections. It has an easy billing system that allows for continu-
ous re-pricing reflecting scarcity conditions on the ground. Un-
like taxicab drivers, who operate under a constant-rate 
schedule, price adjustments bring forth a new supply of driv-
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ers, so that the formerly rocky transportation system corrects 
the distortions that arise in the low-information systems that 
predated Uber. Indeed, casual conversation taught me that cab 
drivers often do both traditional rides and Uber transactions, 
which shows that even the traditional players can benefit from 
the new technology.  And it should be possible for taxi regula-
tors to authorize new services that will help narrow the techno-
logical gap with the new entries. 
Yet we cannot ignore the distribution question. The new arri-
val of Uber undermines the traditional medallions that have ei-
ther been sold or mortgaged. These rights were issued by a state 
that made a solemn promise to protect them, so that there are 
indeed constitutional claims for the protection of these rights 
under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.61 But that 
clause cannot be said to allow the early incumbents to keep out 
the newcomers forever. Rather, it should be read to allow for the 
abrogation of these rights on payment of just compensation for 
their sustained losses.62 So perhaps the best thing to do is to 
make sure that the newcomers have to pay some fee that the 
state then transfers to the incumbents to cover their losses. This 
task is not easy to do because it would be a mistake to assume 
that the holders of existing medallions will not gain from the 
new system, which may well be the case. But it does indicate 
that oftentimes the greatest cost to regulation is that it grandfa-
thers in parties who now have a legitimate beef against techno-
logical change. 
Speaking more generally, it is important to compare regula-
tion with deregulation strategies. Where competitive markets 
are attainable, deregulation leads to higher output and lower 
administrative costs.63 These both cut in the same direction. It is 
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a very easy program to implement if the political will to do it 
can be gathered, but since it knocks out monopoly rents, it is 
extremely difficult unless the judges start to help out from time 
to time. So, to return to our original theme, there is a deep ten-
sion on the social welfare theory between inequality on the one 
hand and the standard definition of a Pareto improvement on 
the other. The fundamental maxim should be “Northeast Ho!!” 
That simple exhortation means that in any two-person game, 
ideally we want to improve the lot of both by moving to the 
northeast, so that both are better off and none worse.64 
But what should be done about separability on the grand 
question of inequality, even for private firms and individuals? 
Well, consider the perspective of a company like Google. The 
last thing it wants to do is to gunk up its innovation process by 
trying to handle an inequality constraint. So what it should do 
is create a separate pool of money and endow a charter school 
or run a special school for minority children, for women, or 
whatever group it wants to assist. Their choice, strictly, not 
mine. Ultimately, Google’s best strategy is to separate redistri-
bution from production, leaving it to decide how much to re-
distribute, who should get it, and on what conditions. 
That is a lot to ask of any single company. But the good 
news about this approach is that Google is not the only player 
in town. Anybody who has a pile of money, with or without a 
technology company, can also start its own distinctive pro-
gram, helping to address either the monopoly problem or in-
equality problem in whatever space it enters. 
At this point, the war against inequality does not disappear 
from view. Quite the contrary, inequality really does matter to 
a lot of people, including lots of innovators and entrepre-
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neurs. But separability leads to the best of all possible worlds 
by coupling high levels of private innovation with the socially 
conscious attack on the sources of inequality by people who 
are keen on the right answer. That is the exact way in which 
we should go. Innovation has its own sphere. And the people 
who can innovate in technology may have a lot to teach us 
about the best ways to combat inequality. 
 
